Is 5% High? US Treasury Yields Since 1962, and the Ruler That Decides the Answer

Two sentences keep coming up in markets lately. The first: "The 10-year yield is closing in on 5% — the last time it was here was 2007." The second: "But over the long run, 5% isn't actually high."

Each is only half right.

The first depends on what "here" means. On a daily-close basis, the 10-year last closed at or above 5% on July 19, 2007. But on October 19, 2023 it closed at 4.98%, and reports at the time said it briefly traded above 5% intraday. The maturity that is genuinely back at 2007 levels is the 30-year: it closed at 5.28% on September 9, 2026, its highest since July 2007, and it has now closed at or above 5% on 62 trading days this year.

The second sentence has a deeper problem. "High" and "low" only mean something relative to a baseline, and changing the baseline flips the answer. This article lays that baseline out and measures it.

Data run through the close of September 9, 2026. On that day: 3-month 3.95%, 2-year 4.43%, 10-year 4.83%, 30-year 5.28%; the effective fed funds rate was 3.63%. The 10-year close was the highest since October 2023; the 2-year was the highest since July 2024.

This is a history and methodology article. It describes only what has happened. It was completed before the August CPI release and does not discuss what that report might show. It is not a forecast, and not a recommendation about any security.

1. Where the numbers come from

Everything comes from the St. Louis Fed's FRED database. FRED is a redistribution platform: whether a series can be republished depends on its original publisher, so the sources fall into three groups.

• US government works, in the public domain: Treasury yields at every maturity, TIPS yields and breakeven inflation (Treasury / Federal Reserve H.15), the federal funds rate (Federal Reserve), the term premium (Federal Reserve Board, Kim–Wright model), CPI and unemployment (BLS), WTI crude oil (EIA), and the deficit and debt as a share of GDP (OMB).
• Usable with attribution: the 30-year fixed mortgage rate. Source: Freddie Mac (Primary Mortgage Market Survey).
• Index providers' licensed products: the NASDAQ Composite and the S&P 500. This article uses percentages only (drawdown depths); no index level appears anywhere. FRED's S&P 500 series covers only the last ten years, so equity episodes before 2016 use the NASDAQ.

Three constraints run through everything below.

Yields are daily closes (H.15 constant-maturity), not intraday highs or lows. That is why "above 5% intraday in October 2023" is not in this data and can only be cited from contemporary reporting.

Changes in yields are always in basis points (bp; 1 bp = 0.01 percentage point). A move from 4.80% to 4.83% is +3 bp. Taking a percentage change of a number that is already a percentage means nothing for a bond, so this article never does it.

The BLS never published CPI for October 2025 (collection was suspended during the federal government shutdown). CPI year-over-year here is always aligned by calendar month: that month, and the same month a year later, have no year-over-year value and nothing is filled in. This is not a technicality. Computing year-over-year by "counting back twelve rows" turns every value from November 2025 onward into a thirteen-month change — numbers that look perfectly normal and are all wrong.

Every number in this article was computed by a program from the public sources above. None was typed in by hand.

2. Is 5% high? Four rulers

The same 4.83%, measured against four different stretches of history:

Against the record since 1962, today's level is below the median — more than half of all trading days were higher. Against the record since 2008, today's level is an extreme: across more than eighteen years and over 4,600 trading days, only 0.19% were higher, and not a single day closed above 5%.

Both statements are true. The question is which ruler bears on the thing you care about.

Decade averages:

The same 5% does not mean the same thing

"5% is not high over the long run" assumes that 5% meant the same thing in every era. There are at least two reasons that assumption fails.

First, the size of the debt is different. In the first quarter of 1981, total US public debt (including intragovernmental holdings) was about 30.87% of GDP. In the first quarter of 2026 it was 122.59%. The same interest rate applied to a debt four times as large puts the government's interest burden on an entirely different scale.

Second, the real rate is different. A nominal yield can be split into two parts: the real yield after expected inflation (measured by 10-year TIPS), plus the inflation the market expects (the gap between the two, called breakeven inflation).

Today's real yield is not only far above the 2008–2021 average; it is slightly above the average of the years around 2007. Measured in real terms, money is tighter now than it was the last time the 10-year touched 5%.

And most of today's asset prices — equity valuations, mortgages, corporate debt structures — were built between 2009 and 2021. The 10-year averaged 2.28% across those thirteen years. For those balance sheets, that is the relevant ruler, not the average since 1962.

3. Recent years: how short, intermediate and long maturities moved

(All figures in %. Fed funds is the effective rate.)

Four things in this table are worth separating.

One: 2022–2024, the short end led and the curve stayed inverted for more than two years. The Fed took the fed funds rate from 0.33% in March 2022 to 5.33% in July 2023. Short maturities followed the policy rate; long maturities did not keep up. The 10-year minus 2-year spread was inverted from July 6, 2022 to August 26, 2024 — 537 trading days, as deep as −108 bp, the longest inversion since 2-year data began in 1976. The 10-year minus 3-month spread was inverted for 534 trading days.

The other long inversions since 1976 (1978–80, 1980–81, 1982, 1989, 2000, 2006–07) all came before or during a recession. This one has not been followed by one so far: unemployment was 4.1% in August 2026.

Two: from September 2024 to January 2025, the Fed cut 100 bp and the 10-year rose 116 bp. Fed funds went from 5.33% to 4.33%; the 10-year went from 3.63% to 4.79%. It is the plainest demonstration there is that the Fed sets the short end and the market prices the long end. Long yields reflect the market's view of inflation, growth and fiscal policy over the next decade, not today's policy rate.

Three: in 2026 the Fed has not moved at all, yet the 2-year is up 105 bp. The fed funds rate has sat near 3.6% since December 2025. From the last trading day before the Iran war (2026-02-27) to September 9:

A flat policy rate with a sharply rising 2-year means the market is pricing the possibility that the Fed's next move is a hike. Kevin Warsh, who became Fed chair in May 2026, held rates steady at his first meeting in June, but the projections released afterward showed that some officials expected to raise rates this year (see the references).

Four: this rise is mostly not about inflation expectations. Taking the September 9 10-year apart:

Breakeven inflation is not extreme. What has risen is the real yield and the term premium — the return investors demand after inflation, and the extra compensation they require for lending to the government for a long time. On these three numbers, the market is pricing "the Fed will act" and "long-dated risk has grown", not runaway inflation expectations. That is the single biggest difference from the 1970s, and section 5 comes back to it.

The term premium is a model estimate, not a market quote. Different models (the New York Fed's ACM model, for instance) give different levels, though broadly the same direction.

4. What happened to stocks when yields rose

The larger drawdowns, and the rate environment around each (yields in %):

After the Iran war began in 2026, from the pre-war close (2026-02-27) to the March 30 low, the NASDAQ fell 8.27% and the S&P 500 fell 7.78%. As of September 9 they were up 12.96% and 11.55% for the year, and 3.10% and 2.09% below their 2026 highs.

The easiest way to misread this table is to assume every crash was caused by rates. It was not.

• 1973–74, 1987, 2022 and autumn 2023: the 10-year rose clearly before or during the decline. Before Black Monday in 1987, the 10-year climbed from 7.18% at the start of the year to 10.23% on October 16 (+305 bp).
• 2000–02: high yields helped trigger the correction, but the 10-year fell during the crash itself (6.39% → 3.61%). The main cause was valuation and earnings, not rates.
• 2025: the main cause was tariffs, and the 10-year also fell over that stretch.

The same direction meant opposite things in different eras

Correlate the NASDAQ's monthly return with the monthly change in the 10-year yield (in bp), split into three eras:

2000–2020 was a low-inflation era: rising yields usually signaled a stronger economy, and stocks rose with them, so the correlation was positive. In 1972–1999, and again since 2021, inflation was the market's main worry: rising yields meant a higher discount rate and pressure to hike, and stocks fell, so the correlation was negative — more negative since 2021 than in the 1970s through 1990s.

So the real question is not what level yields have reached but why they are rising. Through most of the 1990s the 10-year sat between 5% and 8%, while the NASDAQ ran through the entire technology bull market. What was pushing rates up then was productivity and growth, and inflation was falling.

(Correlation is not causation, and the post-2021 sample is only 69 months.)

Why expensive stocks are especially sensitive to rates

A stock is worth the discounted value of all its future cash flows. The more richly valued a company, the more of what investors are paying for lies far in the future — and distant cash flows are the most sensitive to the discount rate. Pure arithmetic:

This is not a valuation of any company. It only shows that the same move in rates hits assets whose cash flows are mostly distant much harder. The "Nifty Fifty" of the early 1970s — high-multiple growth stocks then considered "one-decision" buys you would never need to sell — fell heavily as rates and inflation rose in 1973–74; the NASDAQ's drawdown over the same period in the table above was 59.90%.

5. 1965–1981: how rates got to 15.84%

Around 1981, almost every US interest rate peaked within the same stretch:

Getting there took more than a decade, and at least five layers of cause.

Fiscal policy. The Johnson administration fought the Vietnam War and funded the Great Society at the same time, without raising taxes to match. During Johnson's term, CPI inflation rose from 1.32% to 4.69% and the 10-year rose 188 bp.

The monetary anchor disappeared. On August 15, 1971, Nixon suspended the dollar's convertibility into gold, and the Bretton Woods system collapsed soon after. From then on the dollar had no external anchor; whether inflation was contained depended entirely on the Fed's resolve.

Political pressure. Before the 1972 election Nixon pressed Fed Chair Arthur Burns to keep policy loose, and the White House tapes recorded it (Abrams, 2006). Wage and price controls imposed in the same period were followed by a rebound in prices once they were lifted. During Nixon's term the fed funds rate rose from 6.25% to 12.09%, and CPI inflation from 4.69% to 10.89%.

Energy. The Arab oil embargo of October 1973 and the Iranian revolution of 1979 each drove oil prices sharply higher. The United States was heavily dependent on imported oil, and the shocks passed straight into prices.

Expectations came unanchored. The baby-boom generation flooded into the labor force, and union contracts commonly carried cost-of-living adjustment clauses, producing a loop of wages chasing prices and prices chasing wages. Each time unemployment rose, the Fed stopped tightening, and markets learned that inflation would never really be brought down.

Bondholders paid for this. Subtracting CPI inflation from the 10-year yield gives a rough "ex-post real rate": in December 1974 it was −4.66% — lending to the government for ten years meant losing nearly 5% of purchasing power a year. In 1979, BusinessWeek ran the cover "The Death of Equities."

Volcker, and the painful ending

Carter appointed Paul Volcker as Fed chair in 1979. On August 6, the day he took office, the 10-year stood at 8.91% and fed funds at 10.72%. Two months later the Fed switched to targeting the quantity of bank reserves and let interest rates swing widely. The fed funds rate reached 22.36% on July 22, 1981. The economy went into recession in 1980 and again in 1981–82, and unemployment reached 10.8% in November 1982. The recession is widely seen as one reason Carter lost the 1980 election; Reagan reappointed Volcker in 1983.

Inflation peaked in March 1980, but the 10-year peaked a year and a half later. Two reasons: markets did not yet believe inflation would really come down, and Reagan's large 1981 tax cut combined with a defense buildup pushed the deficit to 5.72% of GDP in fiscal 1983. The result was extremely high real rates in the mid-1980s: the ex-post real rate reached 9.39% in August 1983 and averaged 8.07% across 1984.

6. 1981–2020: what pulled it down

From a 10.59% average in the 1980s to 2.40% in the 2010s, the forty-year decline had no single cause.

The Fed's credibility. From Volcker through Greenspan to Bernanke, markets came to believe the Fed would hold inflation down, and in 2012 the Fed formally adopted a 2% inflation target. Once inflation expectations were anchored, bond investors no longer needed as much compensation for the risk of inflation running away.

Fiscal discipline in the 1990s. George H. W. Bush broke his "no new taxes" pledge in the 1990 budget deal and lost re-election in 1992; Clinton passed a deficit-reduction package in 1993. The deficit went from 4.45% of GDP in fiscal 1992 to a surplus of 2.30% in 2000. Clinton adviser James Carville's well-known line at the time was, roughly, that he would like to be reincarnated as the bond market, because it could intimidate everybody.

It was not a smooth ride. In 1994 the Fed raised the fed funds rate from 3.25% to 6.10%, and the 10-year went from 5.19% in October 1993 to 8.05% in November 1994 (+286 bp) — the episode known as the "bond massacre."

Globalization and the "saving glut." China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, and a flood of low-cost goods held down US prices. Asian central banks and oil exporters recycled their trade surpluses into US Treasuries. The Fed began hiking in June 2004, taking the fed funds rate from 1.02% to above 5%; yet over the first year of hikes the 10-year fell from 4.62% (2004-06-30) to 3.94% (2005-06-30), a decline of 68 bp. Greenspan called it a "conundrum" in testimony to Congress, and Bernanke explained it in 2005 with the idea of a "global saving glut."

Demographics and technology. An aging population raised saving and reduced investment demand, and economists' estimates of the "neutral rate" drifted steadily lower (Summers called it "secular stagnation" in 2013). Information technology brought productivity gains and price transparency, and technology companies were mostly capital-light and borrowed little. (That last point is now reversing in the AI era; see section 7.)

Energy. Oil prices collapsed in 1986. The shale revolution of the 2010s turned the United States into a net exporter of petroleum (crude plus products), and the crude export ban was lifted at the end of 2015. Oil shocks pass through to US inflation far more weakly than they did in the 1970s.

Crises and quantitative easing. Each crisis pushed yields down another notch: 2.08% on December 18, 2008; 1.43% on July 25, 2012; 1.37% on July 5, 2016; and finally 0.52% on August 4, 2020. The Fed bought Treasuries in bulk, and Europe and Japan went to negative rates. When the Fed signaled in 2013 that it would slow its purchases, the 10-year rose from 1.66% on May 1 to 3.04% at year-end (+138 bp) — the "taper tantrum" — but even that did not reverse the trend.

During the pandemic, the 10-year TIPS real yield fell to −1.19% on August 3, 2021, the term premium was −0.66% on August 4, 2020, and the 30-year mortgage rate was 2.65% on January 7, 2021. Those are the moments in the record when money was cheapest.

7. 2021–2026: why it came back

Pandemic-era fiscal policy. The deficit reached 14.48% and 11.69% of GDP in fiscal 2020 and 2021, years spanning the Trump administration's CARES Act and the Biden administration's American Rescue Plan. Debt reached 132.66% of GDP in the second quarter of 2020.

Inflation and hikes. Supply-chain disruptions, then Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 pushing up energy and food prices, took CPI inflation to 8.98% in June 2022 (seasonally adjusted series; the not-seasonally-adjusted figure widely quoted in the news differs slightly), and core CPI to 6.62% in September 2022. The Fed initially described inflation as "transitory" and was late to hike; in March 2022 the ex-post real rate fell to −6.44%, lower than in 1974. The hikes that followed were the fastest since the 1980s.

The 4.98% of autumn 2023. The 10-year rose from 3.30% on April 5, 2023 to 4.98% on October 19, while the real yield rose to 2.52% and the 30-year mortgage rate to 7.79%. The backdrop included an economy more resilient than expected, larger Treasury issuance, and Fitch's downgrade of US credit in August. After the Treasury slowed its increase in long-dated issuance and the Fed signaled the end of hikes, the 10-year was back at 3.79% on December 27.

Large deficits at full employment. From fiscal 2022 through 2025, the deficit stayed between 5.27% and 6.20% of GDP. Deficits of that size have historically come mostly in recessions or wars; in these years unemployment was low throughout. US sovereign credit was downgraded by S&P (2011), Fitch (2023) and Moody's (May 2025), losing its last AAA rating.

The 2025 tariffs. After sweeping tariffs were announced on April 2, stocks, bonds and the dollar fell together for a time. In the week from April 4 to April 11, the 10-year rose 47 bp (4.01% → 4.48%) and the 30-year rose 44 bp. On April 9 Trump paused most of the tariffs and said publicly that bond markets had been "getting yippy." After Moody's downgrade in May, the 30-year reached 5.08% on May 21.

The 2026 Iran war and oil. The United States and Israel attacked Iran on February 28, and Iran then attacked shipping in the Strait of Hormuz; the two sides agreed a ceasefire in April and signed a memorandum in June, and fighting resumed in July (see the references). WTI crude oil:

For comparison, the peak on July 3, 2008 was 145.31, and on March 8, 2022 it was 123.64.

CPI inflation was 2.43% in February 2026, rose to 4.17% in May, and was 3.30% in July; core CPI was 2.47% in July. Month-end yields and oil in 2026:

June is worth noticing: oil had already fallen back to around 70 dollars, yet the 2-year kept rising — that was the month the Fed changed chairs and the post-meeting projections began to include hikes. When oil rebounded in July, the 10-year rose 31 bp in a single month.

AI capital spending is now financed with debt. For more than a decade technology was a capital-light industry. AI data centers need chips, power and land, and the largest cloud companies have become heavy issuers in the corporate bond market. Fortune described the effect at the end of August as "reverse crowding out": money that flows into corporate bonds is money that does not flow into Treasuries, so Treasury yields have to rise to attract buyers. There is no accepted measurement yet of how large the effect is; this article only records that the mechanism has been put forward.

Fed independence. In 2025 Trump tried to remove Fed Governor Lisa Cook. On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court held 5–4 that governors may be removed only for cause and only after notice and an opportunity to respond. Markets care because central-bank independence is one of the foundations that has kept the inflation risk premium low since the 1980s.

8. What presidents had to do with it

The numbers first. The 10-year and fed funds are taken on the first trading day after inauguration and the last trading day before the next; CPI inflation is taken for the inauguration month and the final month:

How to read this table matters more than the table itself.

The long trends crossed party lines. The forty-year decline from 1981 to 2020 ran through six presidents of both parties; the terms in which yields rose sharply also include both parties. The broad direction was set by the inflation regime, central-bank credibility, and global saving and investment — not by who was in the White House.

Start-to-end is a very crude cut. Trump's first-term −138 bp was mostly the 2020 pandemic; Biden's +351 bp started near the pandemic lows. Reading these numbers as any president's "score" leads to the wrong conclusion.

Presidents do have influence, but through specific channels, and at the margin:

1. Appointing the Fed chair — the biggest lever. Carter's appointment of Volcker is the most consequential decision in this table: it ended the Great Inflation, and Carter paid the political price. Nixon and Burns, Trump and Powell, and in 2026 Warsh, are examples of a different kind of relationship.
2. Pressure on the Fed. The Nixon tapes, Trump's public criticism of rate hikes in 2018–19, and the 2025 attempt to remove a governor. Markets respond by demanding more compensation for inflation risk.
3. Deficits. Larger deficits mean more Treasury issuance and potentially a higher term premium. Johnson's "guns and butter," Reagan's tax cuts and defense buildup, George W. Bush's tax cuts and wars, the pandemic relief bills under presidents of both parties, and the 2025 tax law all belong here.
4. Trade. China's WTO entry, pursued under Clinton, was a long-run force holding prices down; the tariffs of 2018 and 2025 pushed them up.
5. Energy. Nixon's price controls, Carter's energy policy, the 2015 lifting of the crude export ban, the 2022 release from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and the 2026 Iran war.
6. War. Vietnam, Iraq, and Iran in 2026.

Influence also runs the other way: the bond market constrains presidents. Clinton put deficit reduction ahead of other priorities in 1993 partly because of the bond market, and Trump cited the bond market directly when pausing tariffs in April 2025.

9. Mortgages: where rates land on ordinary households

Source: Freddie Mac (Primary Mortgage Market Survey).

Mortgage rates broadly track the 10-year Treasury, separated by a spread. That spread averaged 1.70 percentage points from 1972 to 2019. It widened to 3.26 percentage points on November 10, 2022, when rate volatility was extreme and the Fed, shrinking its balance sheet, had stopped buying mortgage-backed securities. The latest reading is 1.94 points.

Around 2021 a large share of homeowners locked in mortgages near 3%. With rates at 6% to 7%, moving means giving up a cheap old loan, and many people chose not to sell. That kept the supply of homes for sale low and prices high even as rates rose. Housing costs carry a large weight in CPI, which is one reason inflation has come down slowly in this cycle.

10. What this establishes, and what it does not

What it establishes: on a daily-close basis, the 10-year Treasury yield on September 9, 2026 was the highest since October 2023 and the 30-year the highest since July 2007; 5% is not high relative to the record since 1962 but is an extreme relative to the record since 2008; the recent rise came mostly from the real yield and the term premium rather than from inflation expectations; and the relationship between yields and stocks changes sign with the inflation regime.

What it does not establish: where yields go next. In hindsight 1981 and 2020 were both turning points, but that kind of thing is known only in hindsight. Nor does it establish that any president "caused" any stretch of rates. That would take causal analysis, not a start-and-end comparison of terms in office.

Also not established: what any reader "should" hold. Everything above is a historical measurement published for a general audience, identical for every reader.

11. Methodology and known limits

1. Yields are H.15 daily closes, not intraday. "Above 5% intraday in October 2023" can only be cited from contemporary reporting. The long-run chart uses month-end values.
2. CPI is the seasonally adjusted series (CPI-U SA), which differs slightly from the not-seasonally-adjusted year-over-year figure common in the news; October 2025 has no official data, as described in section 1.
3. The "ex-post real rate" is a rough measure: it uses realized inflation, not the inflation markets expected at the time. The TIPS real yield is a better measure, but its data begin only in 2003.
4. The term premium is a model estimate. This article uses the Federal Reserve Board's Kim–Wright model; other models give different levels.
5. The time windows for equity drawdowns were chosen to match the episodes; peaks and troughs within each window were then found by the program. FRED's S&P 500 covers only the last ten years, so earlier episodes use the NASDAQ, which is technology-heavy and does not represent the whole market.
6. The presidential table is a start-and-end comparison, not a causal analysis. Single-day readings near inauguration dates carry noise of their own.
7. Events in 2026 (the Iran war, the change of Fed chair, the Supreme Court ruling) are drawn from news reports and the Congressional Research Service, listed in the references. Those descriptions were not computed from this article's data.
8. Everything here is a historical measurement, with no forecasting component.

References

Data sources

• FRED — 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity (DGS10), with DGS3MO, DGS2 and DGS30 — US Treasury / Federal Reserve H.15
• FRED — 10-Year TIPS yield (DFII10) and 10-Year Breakeven Inflation (T10YIE)
• FRED — Effective Federal Funds Rate (DFF), monthly (FEDFUNDS), and 3-Month Treasury Bill (TB3MS)
• FRED — 10-Year Term Premium, Kim–Wright model (THREEFYTP10)
• FRED — CPI-U (CPIAUCSL), core CPI (CPILFESL) and unemployment rate (UNRATE) — BLS
• FRED — WTI crude oil spot price (DCOILWTICO) — EIA
• FRED — Total public debt as % of GDP (GFDEGDQ188S) and federal surplus or deficit as % of GDP (FYFSGDA188S)
• Freddie Mac — Primary Mortgage Market Survey (via FRED MORTGAGE30US)
• FRED — NASDAQ Composite (NASDAQCOM) and S&P 500 (SP500) — used only to compute drawdown percentages

Literature

• Burton A. Abrams, "How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes," Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(4), 2006
• Ben S. Bernanke, "The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit," speech, March 10, 2005
• Alan Greenspan, semiannual monetary policy report to Congress, February 16, 2005 (source of "conundrum")
• Don H. Kim and Jonathan H. Wright, "An Arbitrage-Free Three-Factor Term Structure Model and the Recent Behavior of Long-Term Yields and Distant-Horizon Forward Rates," FEDS Working Paper 2005-33

Events, 2023–2026

• CNBC, "The 10-year Treasury yield just crossed 5% for the first time since 2007," October 20, 2023
• Britannica, "2026 Iran war"; Congressional Research Service, "The Strait of Hormuz"
• Yahoo Finance, "Kevin Warsh sworn in as Fed chair"; CNN, "Warsh promises a new vision for the Fed," June 17, 2026
• SCOTUSblog, "Court prevents Trump from firing Fed governor," June 2026
• Fortune, "AI hyperscalers issuing a flood of bonds are 'reverse crowding out' the Treasury," August 29, 2026

Disclaimer

This article is published by Elnath Finance Academy for general informational and educational purposes. It is written for all readers and is identical for everyone. It is not investment advice, not a personalized recommendation, and not an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security. Elnath Finance Academy is not a registered investment adviser.

All figures are historical measurements computed from the public sources named above. They describe the past; they are not a forecast of interest rates, inflation or any market, and not a guarantee of any future result. Yields and bond prices move in opposite directions: a rising yield means falling prices for existing bonds.

Index and company names are the property of their respective owners and are used here for identification and educational reference only. Elnath Finance Academy is not affiliated with, sponsored by, or endorsed by any index provider. Mortgage rate data are from Freddie Mac.

Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. Consult a qualified professional where appropriate.